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. To play this role, Britain relied on a number of key instruments, including its army, its fleet and -because these were expensive -an impressive administrative structure which provided the funds for these 2 . But another, and far less expensive, instrument of British policy after 1689 was an expanding diplomatic network across Europe. This enhanced pattern of diplomatic contacts embraced, to a degree it had not done before 1688 3 , Switzerland, i.e. the Helvetic Body (the confederation of thirteen cantons, its associates and allies), the republic of Geneva and the Grisons 4 .
2
What follows is less concerned with the detail of diplomatic activity -policy and its implementation in the form of bilateral negotiations -which is the traditional focus of diplomatic history. The latter has largely fallen out of fashion after once being one of the pre-eminent types of historical investigation. Instead, and reflecting the emergence in recent decades of what is sometimes called the " New Diplomatic History " 5 , I shall focus on the diplomats who resided in Switzerland, negotiated there, and reported from there. I will begin by considering the broad aims and objectives, and the methods of British policy in Switzerland, because these would affect when a man was sent, and for how long, as well as what sort of man he was and the diplomatic rank he enjoyed, all of which I will then discuss. 3 British diplomats, and the structure within which they operated in this period -the British diplomatic " service ", if the latter is not too anachronistic a term -have not been ignored by historians, as the following pages will reveal 6 . Nevertheless, those diplomats who served in Switzerland tend to be overlooked in favour of men of greater promi nence and achievement in other postings. Besides bringing into view Britain's rather shadowy representatives in Switzerland, I hope to use them to engage with some of the arguments or conclusions of various historians, including H. M. Scott, for whom the diplomatic culture of eighteenth century Europe was increasingly francophone, " resident ", and noble 7 . At the same time, it should be possible to throw light on questions such as the degree of professionalism of British diplomats and the British diplomatic service 8 . 4 The main source for what follows are the instructions issued by the Secretary of State's (and from 1782 the Foreign Secretary's) office in London and successive British ministers in Switzerland 9 , and the official correspondence which the latter maintained with the former, and which is housed in the National Archives in London, in the State Papers ; copies of these letters can sometimes also be found in the British Library, in London. Also useful, where it throws light on the British representatives in Switzerland, are the letters of British ministers elsewhere, notably in Paris and Turin, those of the British representatives in Switzerland with the ministers there of other sovereigns, and those of foreign diplomats 10 .
Role 5
British diplomatic method or practice would also shape missions. British ministers generally preferred, for various reasons, to negotiate through their representatives abroad, although this was not consistently adhered to 11 . It might be difficult in Switzerland, for two reasons. Firstly, there was the religious divide, further evidence that -contrary to a well-entrenched belief -religion remained a complicating factor in international relations after 1648
But these functioned within a framework of larger objectives, some transient others more permanent. 7 In 1689, at the start of the Nine Years War, the newly-elevated William III had one pressing concern, i.e. to have other states acknowledge him and his wife as king and queen. This was no easy matter, not least because Louis XIV of France and the Pope continued to recognise the exiled James II as king and pressed other catholic states to do the same. The matter continued to affect Britain's foreign relations following the decision in 1701 to settle the crown on the Protestant house of Hanover when queen Anne died as was expected without direct heirs, excluding not only James II's son, the " Old Pretender ", but also other, Catholic claimants, including the princes of the house of Savoy. These developments meant that the British succession was an issue in international affairs until at least the abortive Jacobite rebellion of 1745-1746 16 . As far as Switzerland was concerned, the Catholic cantons did not recognise the first Hanoverian, George I, as king until 1716 17 . 8 Besides securing his recognition by the Swiss, William III also hoped, in 1689, to draw them into the coalition he was building against France, not least because France's southeastern border was the most vulnerable to invasion following Louis XIV's fortressbuilding programme of the 1680s ; this stimulated English hopes of entering France there, fomenting a Protestant revolt in the south which should undermine France's war effort and force Louis XIV to seek peace 18 . William and his allies continued to see the Swiss as a valuable addition to any alliance against France. Thus, in the summer of 1696, towards the close of the Nine Years War, and in order to prevent the conclusion of a separate peace between the Duke of Savoy, Victor Amadeus II, and Louis XIV, the leaders of the anti-French coalition hoped that -in return for a subsidy -the Helvetic Body might join England, the Dutch and the Emperor in guaranteeing the Duke's states, and provide him with troops 19 . The more ambitious of these hopes were disappointed in the Nine Years War and the War of the Spanish Succession (1701/1702-1713/1714), a period in which English diplomacy in the region was crucially re-oriented in this part of Europe, away from the Helvetic Body and in favour of the Savoyard state -guardian of the alpine passages between north Italy and the south of France -as the most obvious collaborator in pursuit of its objectives in the south against France, with important implications for British diplomatic representation in Switzerland. Thereafter, the Duke of Savoy (king of Sicily, 1713-1720 ; king of Sardinia from 1720) was Britain's " natural " ally there 20 , although aspirations of the sort just mentioned -and a desire to ensure Geneva did not succumb to French pressure but remained neutral -continued to influence British policy in the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748) and the Seven Years War (1756-1763) 21 .
9
Another function of British -as of other -diplomats in Switzerland was the periodic negotiation of agreements, or capitulations, to raise troops there, and the renewal and/or renegotiation of existing accords 22 . Following the failure to secure 4,000 Swiss troops in the opening phase of the Nine Years War 23 , most of the extra troops Britain needed in this period were hired from various Protestant German princes -including Hesse-Kassel and Wurttemberg -or obtained by subsidising the Dukes of Savoy, reducing the need for Swiss troops, but Britain sometimes still looked to Switzerland ; in 1734, for example, sir Robert Walpole hoped to secure 6,000 Swiss troops 24 . . British ministers in Switzerland continued to believe that money facilitated success in Switzerland ; in 1757, commenting on French concern at the progress of Spanish influence in the cantons in recent years, Villettes observed that " as in the last war [that of the Austrian Succession], Spanish gold will get the better of the French ambassador's rhetoric " 34 . Having said that, it was one thing to be promised a pension, another to receive it, because pensions were often irregularly paid and frequently in arrears 35 . 11 Negotiations -for alliances, for troops, and for loans 36 -tended to be episodic. So, too, were the representations -official and unofficial -it was sometimes necessary to make to the Swiss authorities ; in 1778, for example, during the American War of Independence, Braun was ordered to press the enforcement of the cantons' laws against the export of timber, in order to prevent the French navy securing a supply of this crucial raw material 37 . But . In later, more peaceful years, the British minister in Switzerland was expected to report on all aspects of the government, finance, and so on of the Helvetic Body 54 , a distinctive new interest in the resources of other states on the part of ministers in London which was a marked feature of the era 55 . One particular area of concern of the British authorities, and which British ministers in Switzerland played a part in monitoring was the activity abroad of Jacobite exiles, adherents of the ousted James II and his son 56 . In 1720, for example, Francis Manning reported the passage through Geneva of lady Mar, who was returning to England to press the restoration of her exiled husband, the Duke of Mar 57 . In 1755, Villettes claimed that the cost of the correspondence he maintained with Neuchatel, where the Jacobite earl Marischal was governor for the king of Prussia, and with Provence, was £ 200 annually 58 . 16 One source of intelligence was a network of correspondents throughout Switzerland.
Coxe, for example, based in Zurich, had correspondents at Bern, Soleure, Basel, Coire, Constance, Geneva and elsewhere Norton, forwarded to London a copy of a letter received from his correspondent at Lucern which gave valuable information regarding Spanish policy in Switzerland. 17 Besides giving gratifications, successive British ministers sought to oil the wheels of diplomacy by entertaining members of the local elite. This " social diplomacy " could advance political objectives 62 . Diplomats not only entertained the local elites. Although there was not a substantial diplomatic corps in Switzerland (above), diplomatic communities in the cantons could enrich elite social life and facilitate diplomacy 63 . Foreign diplomats often resided in different towns, but could easily reach each other. Thus, on the occasion of the Diet of the Protestant cantons he had convened at Arau to discuss William III's alliance project in June 1690, Coxe was visited by the Savoyard envoy, count Gouvon (or Govone), who was accompanied by his wife and family
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; and in the spring of 1754, the new Imperial minister, Mareschal visited Zurich to deliver his credentials as resident from The Emperor and Empress, and to call on the British minister, then returned to reside at Basel 65 . These official contacts sometimes bolossomed into what seem like real friendships ; this seems to have happened in the case of Coxe and Gouvon. Both men were accompanied by their wives, who seem to have fully participated in the developing amity, suggesting ways in which women could participate in an unofficial way in diplomacy which was otherwise -and particularly in its formal, public operation -a largely masculine world 66 . 18 Besides these political functions, British ministers in Switzerland in the eighteenth century were expected to look after the growing number of British visitors to Switzerland, some simply passing through, others residing for longer periods -including for example the Stanhopes, who spent ten years in Geneva between 1764 and 1774 -often for educational purposes 67 . Some of these travellers were of the most distinguished rank, including in 1782, George III's son, the Duke of Gloucester visited Geneva incognito, during the Franco-Sardinian-Bernese occupation when there was no British diplomatic presence in the republic, before moving on to Bern 68 . For another, less exalted British visitor, William Wickham, study at Geneva university was followed by marriage into the local elite ; it also prepared him for a diplomatic role in Switzerland after 1789 69 . It was not only the monarch's British subjects who passed through ; in 1753, Bern was visited by professor Haller, of the university of Gottingen -a Hanoverian subject of George II -there to marry off his daughter and to seek one of the leading vacant offices in the canton 70 . Those visitors -and their relations -expected to be helped, particularly those of elevated rank. In 1755, the Duke of Dorset requested that Villettes arrange the incarceration there of Dorset's son, lord John Sackville, whose lifestyle was threatening his own health and the reputation of his family 71 . But British ministers also had to be vigilant, because travellers might be vulnerable. , although these sometimes dwindled in frequency and also became rather brief and formal, even formulaic when there was little to report. eighteenth century 74 . Indeed, in 1757, the British minister in Madrid, sir Benjamin Keene, wrote to a correspondent :
How often have I told you, and you agree to it, that Swisserland is the country to be employed in, where there are no admirals, no privateers, no trade, nor navigation 75 . 21 The real importance of Switzerland in British policy and diplomacy had clearly declined dramatically since 1689, and since there was no royal Court and little by way of a diplomatic community resident in one place, the representatives of the various states tending to reside in different cities, a choice in part determined by religion, related duties were not their lot 76 . The duties of successive British representatives in Switzerland, finally, did not necessitate a permanent mission, nor did they require the selection of a figure of great ability or high rank, or the appointment of somebody to a high diplomatic rank. 106 . 27 Norton's absence was one indication of the secondary importance of the official British missions to Switzerland in the later eighteenth century ; another was the low diplomatic rank held by most of the men sent there. When the system of resident diplomats developed, in fifteenth century Italy, there were relatively few ranks in what was a very simple hierarchy ; the basic distinction was between ambassadors and lesser ministers, or residents. By the eighteenth century, however, the earlier simplicity had developed into something much more elaborate. At the top was still the ambassador, almost always now " extraordinary'. Below, the rank of resident was declining in status and increasingly oversha dowed by the relatively new rank of envoy extraordinary ; envoys were often given the added dignity of plenipotentiary or minister plenipotentiary. Practice varied from state to state but increasingly conformed to this hierarchy. Firmly at the bottom of the hierarchy were the charge, secretary and so on. All sovereigns, royal and republican, were acutely aware of what was happening, and alert to the distinctions, as were those they sent abroad to represent them 107 .
28 Britain sent no ambassadors to Switzerland between 1689 and 1789. This contrasts markedly with the number of ambassadors sent by Britain to the French Court in the same period 108 , and with French representation in Switzerland ; between 1689 and 1789, of 35 diplomats listed by Livet as despatched to the Helvetic body, 19 -well over halfwent as ambassador, almost all of the remainder enjoying the rank of chargé 109 . As for Spain, of the 10 men residing there on behalf of the Catholic King between 1689 and 1789 (really only to 1769), only one went as ambassador, two as envoy extraordinary, 4 as chargé d'affaires, 2 as resident, the last as minister plenipotentiary 110 . Equally striking was the fact that, after an initial period in which the appointment of envoys extraordinary was favoured (Coxe, Hervart, Aglionby and Stanyan) between 1689 and 1714, with one further appointment at this rank during the War of the Austrian Succession (de Salis) 111 , the remaining nine individuals listed by Horn were all appointed at the inferior rank of chargé d'affaires, secretary, minister and/or minister resident 112 . There were many variables which influenced the rank at which a diplomatic appointment was made, including the social status of the individual concerned 113 and the cost ; in 1752, Villettes' annual salary as minister in Switzerland was £ 1095, plus £ 400 in extraordinaries, far less than what ambassadors and envoys received 114 . Clearly, the status of the British mission to Switzerland declined as the century went on. . Among the advantages for the British government of employing Swiss was that they could exploit their local connections, kin and so on. Thus, Colonel Braun was a scion of one of the leading families of Bern and was connected by marriage with many of the rest 138 , which Erskine was able to make use of when seeking to recruit men in 1778 ; Braun -although not officially ordered to help Erskine enlist men for the East India Company -gave him letters of introduction to his own friends and relations 139 . But the use of natives could also be problematic ; this was certainly the case with colonel James Pictet, whom the Genevan authorities refused to admit as British minister (above), not least because of his interference in politics there 140 ; they also refused to accept his son 141 .
33 How far were these men professionals, men with appropriate, specialist training and pursuing a career in diplomacy ? Burnaby was one of the graduates of a scheme to prepare men for the diplomatic service by establishing Regius chairs of modern history at the universities of Oxford and Cambridge (1724) 142 . He then served as secretary in Paris to earl Waldegrave, before going to Sweden and Switzerland, which appears however to have been his last diplomatic appointment 143 . Burnaby's career reveals that some of the men sent to reside in Switzerland on behalf of the British government certainly had diplomatic experience. Aglionby had earlier been appointed to Turin. As for Stanyan he had been secretary in both Constantinople, Venice and Paris, his appointment as envoy in Switzerland thus representing a promotion, and in he 1712 prepared a memorandum suggesting major changes -improvements -to the management of Britain's foreign affairs, although it was not acted upon 144 . Dayrolle had been Trumbull's secretary at Constantinople. Another who fitted into this category was Jean Gabriel Catt, who began his career as secretary to Thomas Robinson (1st baron Grantham) during the War of the Austrian Succession, for 8 years, first in Vienna and then at Aix-la-Chapelle, before working as Villettes' secretary for another 8 years at Bern, then 2 years to Colebrook, before being given responsibility himself (1764-1765). He then acted as secretary to Norton, but after nearly 22 years of service, foreseeing destitution, in 1768 -and again in 1769 following Norton's return -he requested some sort of reward, possibly a pension, from the British government 145 . To some extent these men were professionals, although we should not exaggerate the extent to which any diplomatic " service " was professional in any modern sense in the eighteenth century 146 . And experience was no guarantee of capacity. Villettes had not been a brilliant success in Turin. He wrote excessively long despatches, and was on one occasion rebuked for it 147 ; but, for all his words, he often
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failed to inform 148 . Clearly, however, he was thought capable of filling the limited requirements of the Swiss residency.
34 Relevant experience might help explain why a man was appointed (to Switzerland) but important too were connections, political and family. This is evident in the case of Coxe, who may have been sent to Switzerland because of William III's obligations to his family and friends in the wake of his seizure of the English throne 149 . Despite his failure in Switzerland, Coxe hoped to secure another posting, angling for the more important post at The Hague at the end of 1693. However, the then Secretary of State, sir John Trenchard, was certain that king William would not employ Coxe, having been informed by the earl of Nottingham that Coxe had agreed to go to New England but not gone. Coxe's informant's comment reveals much about contemporary politics and appointments ; " I always told you how your commerce with Lord Nottingham would end. Do you think he can serve a man sincerely that comes out of our family ", confirming that family connections remained important in appointments after 1688 150 . As for Arsellières, he was known both to the Huguenot Shombergs and to William III's confidant, viscount Sidney
.
35 Equally pertinent is the question, why did men want to serve the king in Switzerland, especially given that it was often a difficult life, in which salaries and costs might go unpaid for long periods 152 . For some, it was simply a route to something better at home 153 .
Perceptions of Switzerland
36 How did British diplomats perceive, respond to their exposure to Swiss institutions, politics and society ? Very few penned the sort of wide-ranging end of mission survey, or relation, of the sort associated with Venetian diplomats, although Aglionby prepared an account of his negotiations which is now in the National Archives at Kew
154
. But Aglionby's survey was not published as was Stanyan's Account of Switzerland (1714) 155 . Nevertheless, although few of their observations were made public, Britain's diplomats did frequently comment on, generalise about Switzerland, its institutions and way of life, observations which throw some light on the mentalité of the British ministers in Switzerland in this period. In the case of most of these men, there was frequently a critical, moralising tone to their observations, in which the corruption of a simple people was to the fore. Villettes, for example, in the context of the Spanish troop capitulations which he reported in 1755 referred to corruption as something especially likely to happen in the smaller, poorer cantons 156 . Later that same year, Villettes thought it would be difficult to find a suitable governor in Switzerland for the grandson of the Landgrave of Hesse -which he had been asked to help in (above) -because of the total want of education there and the widespread influence of French manners, resulting in the introduction of lu xury and vices in the republican state 157 . Just how far observations of this sort were not simply an attempt to fend off an unwelcome task or justify in advance a diplomatic failure is debatable, but the complaint of Swiss corruption, and of the decline of republican simplicity and virtue, was a commonplace of British diplomatic reports between 1689 and 1789.
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Conclusion 37 According to Lucien Bély, Switzerland's place in the diplomacy of early modern Europe has been relatively neglected 158 . The observation is just, but so too is the neglect, since Switzerland chose not to play a major role in international affairs. British diplomacy in eighteenth century Switzerland reflected that fact. Initially, after 1689, English ministers sought to bring the Swiss into the anti-French coalitions, but they were forced to acknowledge that this was unlikely to happen ; thereafter, down to 1789, British diplomacy had less ambitious concerns. This was reflected in the fact that Britain sometimes had a restricted presence in Switzerland. Even when there was a British representative there, the minister was of relatively humble origins, enjoying a fairly junior rank, and often absent, his place occupied by an even humbler figure of local (in this case, Swiss) extraction. While some of those sent to Switzerland could be said to be professional diplomats, for none was Switzerland a stage in a glittering diplomatic career 159 . Equally, the Swiss mission does not easily fit into H. M. Scott's developing diplomatic culture, but it is arguable that the latter -resident, noble, francophone -was not as domi nant as one which might be more typically characterised as intermittent or absent, nonnoble (though not entirely obscure) and anglophone (except when French-speakers were employed). Indeed, it is arguable that the low-ranking (in all senses) men were the real work-horses of British diplomacy in the eighteenth century 
ABSTRACTS
This essay explores the men who represented England (Britain following the Union of England and Scotland in 1707) between 1689 and 1789 . It looks at what they were expected to do, at their origins, and at their careers. Reflecting the relative lack of importance of Switzerland in British diplomacy in the eighteenth century, resident British missions there were infrequent. In addition, most British diplomats sent to Switzerland were of relatively inferior social status, and most were appointed at a very junior diplomatic rank. In conclusion, British diplomacy and diplomats in Switzerland do not easily fit into the " diplomatic culture " which some historians have identified as developing in the eighteenth century and which clearly applies to the more important Courts to which Britain sent representatives after 1689.
